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Abstract
Among several possibilities for what reality could be like in view of the empir-
ical facts of quantum mechanics, one is provided by theories of spontaneous wave
function collapse, the best known of which is the Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber (GRW)
theory. We show mathematically that in GRW theory (and similar theories) there
are limitations to knowledge, that is, inhabitants of a GRW universe cannot find
out all the facts true about their universe. As a specific example, they cannot ac-
curately measure the number of collapses that a given physical system undergoes
during a given time interval; in fact, they cannot reliably measure whether one
or zero collapses occur. Put differently, in a GRW universe certain meaningful,
factual questions are empirically undecidable. We discuss several types of limita-
tions to knowledge and compare them with those in other (no-collapse) versions of
quantum mechanics, such as Bohmian mechanics. Most of our results also apply
to observer-induced collapses as in orthodox quantum mechanics (as opposed to
the spontaneous collapses of GRW theory).
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Science may set limits to knowledge, but should not set limits to imagination.
(Bertrand Russell, 1872–1970)
1 Introduction
Since science provides us with knowledge, it may seem surprising that it sometimes
sets limitations to knowledge. By a “limitation to knowledge” we mean that certain
facts about the world cannot be discovered or confirmed in an empirical way, no matter
how big our effort, including possible future technological advances. For example, a
limitation to knowledge is in place if a quantity cannot be measured although it has a
well-defined value. A limitation to knowledge means that there is a fact, and we cannot
know what it is, nor even guess with much of a chance of guessing correctly. Nature
knows and we do not.
In this paper, we discuss certain limitations to knowledge concerning the collapse
of the wave function in quantum physics. Specifically, we investigate limitations to
measuring whether or not a collapse has occurred. Our results are epistemology in the
sense that they concern the possibility of a particular type of knowledge. Since they
can be proved via mathematical theorems, they can be said to fall into the field of
mathematical epistemology. Some preliminary results have been reported in [30].
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The very idea of a limitation to knowledge may seem to go against the principles of
science. If there is no way of measuring a quantity X, then this may suggest that X does
not actually have a well-defined value, i.e., that nature does not know either what X is.
For example, in the early days of relativity theory, Lorentz and Fitzgerald proposed that
the ether causes a length contraction of moving objects, which implies that the speed
of earth relative to the ether cannot be measured; however, this situation suggests, as
argued by Einstein, that the “speed relative to the ether” is not well defined.
However, the existence of limitations to knowledge is a fact, as it is a simple conse-
quence of quantum mechanics, independently of which interpretation of quantum me-
chanics we prefer. For example, suppose Alice prepares an ensemble of quantum systems,
each with a pure state chosen randomly with distribution µ1 over the unit sphere
S(H ) =
{
ψ ∈H : ‖ψ‖ = 1} (1)
in Hilbert space H . Suppose further that µ2 6= µ1 is another distribution over S(H )
with the same density matrix, ρµ1 = ρµ2 , where
ρµ =
∫
S(H )
µ(dψ) |ψ〉〈ψ| . (2)
Then Bob is unable to determine (even probabilistically) by means of experiments on
the systems whether Alice used µ1 or µ2 (see Appendix A for the proof), while there
is a fact about whether the states actually have distribution µ1 or µ2, as Alice knows
the pure state of each system. Thus, the predictions of quantum mechanics imply that
there are facts in the world which cannot be discovered empirically.1
What is upsetting about limitations to knowledge is that they conflict with key ideas
of (what may be called) positivism: That a statement is unscientific or even meaningless
if it cannot be tested experimentally, that an object is not real if it cannot be observed,
and that a variable is not well-defined if it cannot be measured. We conclude that this
form of positivism is exaggerated; it is inadequate. The above example with Alice and
Bob refutes it. As an even simpler example against this form of positivism, suppose
a space ship falls into a black hole; it seems reasonable to believe that it continues
to exist for a while although we cannot observe it any more. While perhaps nobody
would defend positivism as we described it, it is frequently applied in physics reason-
ing, particularly in quantum physics—ironically so, since its inadequacy is particularly
1This argument has a curious feature that is worth commenting on. While its goal is to show that
there is some information that nature knows but no observer can obtain, it actually describes a situation
in which Alice (who is an observer, one would guess) is in possession of the relevant information, and
only Bob cannot obtain it—except perhaps by spying out Alice’s notebook! So it may seem that the
argument cannot reach its goal. However, the argument does show that there is no way to obtain
a certain information about a system from interaction with the system, and that is enough for our
purposes. Alice then plays the role of proving (to a positivist) that that information objectively exists.
Alternatively, one could also argue as follows. If Alice destroyed the records of the states she prepared
then nobody would know, while it seems plausible that nature still knows the states (since it seems
implausible that the states would suddenly become indefinite if Alice burns her notebook). Thus, the
example also easily provides a case in which nobody is in possession of the relevant information.
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clear in quantum physics, as the example with Alice and Bob shows. Needless to say,
positivism is also unnecessary in quantum physics, as demonstrated by the viability of
“realist” interpretations of quantum mechanics (“quantum theories without observers”)
such as Bohmian mechanics [11, 28], spontaneous collapse theories [24, 8, 36, 16, 22],
and perhaps (some versions of) many-worlds [21, 40, 4].
It is sometimes suggested that a theory is unconvincing if it entails limitations to
knowledge. We do not share this sentiment. On the contrary, we think it is hard to
defend in view of the considerations around (2).
In this paper, we deal primarily with spontaneous collapse theories, concretely with
the simplest and best-known one, the Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber (GRW) theory [24, 8] in
the versions GRWm [16, 10, 27] and GRWf [8, 38]; for an introduction see, e.g., [3, 8, 22].
We briefly review GRW theory in Section 2. Quantum theories without observers have
no need for the orthodox quantum philosophy of “complementarity.” In these theories,
it is clear what is real. And thus, the possibility arises that certain things that are real
cannot be observed.
It is necessary to distinguish between quantum measurements and (what we call)
genuine measurements. Quantum measurements are not literally measurements in the
ordinary sense, i.e., they are not experiments for discovering the values of variables that
have well-defined values.2 In contrast, in a quantum theory without observers there are
several variables that are supposed to have well-defined values, and we may ask whether
and how we could measure these: for example, the wave function ψ, the matter density
m(x, t) in GRWm, the flashes in GRWf. We call experiments discovering these values
genuine measurements.
We show that certain well-defined variables in GRW theories do not permit genuine
measurements; that is, that certain facts in GRW worlds cannot be found out by the
inhabitants of those worlds. At the same time, there is no way of replacing the GRW
theories with simpler and more parsimonious theories by merely denying the factual
character of what the inhabitants cannot find out,3 much in contrast to an unobservable
ether whose existence can very well be denied.
These limitations to knowledge arise as a consequence of the defining equations of
the theories. They are not further, ad hoc postulates; and they do not require carefully
contrived, or conspiratorial, initial conditions. Instead, they are dictated by the physical
laws. The GRW theories thus exemplify Einstein’s dictum that “it is the theory which
decides what can be observed” [20]. The situation is in a way parallel to that of black
holes, where also the physical law itself (in that case, the Einstein equation of general
2Indeed, it is the content of the “no-hidden-variable theorems” such as Gleason’s and Kochen–
Specker’s that one cannot think of the outcomes of quantum measurements as values that were already
known to nature before the experiment, and merely made known to us by the experiment.
3That is, if, in reaction to our result that the flashes cannot be measured accurately, one dropped
the flashes from the reality, then one would end up with the GRW wave function without a primitive
ontology, which is not a satisfactory physical theory [33, 34, 3, 32, 1, 2]. Likewise, if, in reaction to our
result that the number of collapses in a given time interval [t1, t2] cannot be accurately measured, one
decided that there is no fact about the number of collapses in [t1, t2], then one would have to drop the
GRW law of wave function evolution, and thus leave the framework of GRW theories.
4
relativity) implies that observers outside the black hole cannot find out what happens
inside. We emphasize that the limitations of knowledge in GRW theories do not in any
way represent a drawback of these theories.
This paper is organized as follows. In the remainder of Section 1, we provide back-
ground on the concept of a limitation to knowledge by describing examples. In Section 2
we review the definition of the GRW theories. In Section 3 we introduce our main tool
and prove, as a first result, that the function m(x) in GRWm cannot be measured with
microscopic accuracy. In Section 4 we present detailed results about the accuracy with
which a collapse can be detected. In Section 5 we investigate the accuracy with which
the function m(x) in GRWm can be measured.
1.1 Known Examples of Limitations to Knowledge
1. Some limitations to knowledge are quite familiar: It is impossible to look into the
future (e.g., to find out next week’s stock prices in less time than a week), to look
directly into the past (e.g., to determine systematically who Jack the Ripper was),
to look into a spacelike separated region (superluminal signaling), or to look into
a black hole.
2. Quantum theory is particularly rich in limitations to knowledge, as exemplified
by items 2–10 in this list. To begin with, as already mentioned, it is impossible
to distinguish empirically between two different ensembles of wave functions with
the same density matrix.
3. It is impossible to measure the wave function of an individual system. For exam-
ple, if Alice chooses a direction in space and prepares a single particle in a pure
spin state pointing in this direction then Bob cannot determine this direction by
means of whichever experiment on the particle. The best Bob can do is a Stern–
Gerlach experiment in (say) the z direction, which yields one bit of information
and tells Bob whether Alice’s chosen direction is more likely to lie in the upper or
lower hemisphere. Bob can do better if Alice prepares N  1 disentangled par-
ticles, each in the same pure spin state; by means of Stern–Gerlach experiments
in different directions and a statistical analysis of the results, he can estimate the
direction with arbitrary accuracy (with high probability) for sufficiently large N .
(It is sometimes suggested that “protective measurements” can measure the wave
function. However, these experiments involve a mechanism that restores the initial
wave function ψ0 of the system after a (weak) interaction with the apparatus, and
many repetitions of the procedure. Thus, in effect, the apparatus is provided with
many copies of the same wave function ψ0, so that the possibility of determining
ψ0 is in agreement with what we said earlier in this paragraph.)
4. A different type of limitation to knowledge comes up in quantum cryptography,
specifically in quantum key distribution: The eavesdropper Eve cannot obtain
useful information about the key created by Alice and Bob using a quantum key
distribution scheme without leaving traces that Alice and Bob can detect.
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5. “Absolute uncertainty” in Bohmian mechanics [17]: Given that the (conditional)
wave function of a system is ψ, it is impossible for an inhabitant of a Bohmian
universe to know the system’s configuration more accurately than allowed by the
|ψ|2 distribution. If the configuration gets measured more accurately, then the
conditional wave function becomes narrower. (However, while Bohmian mechanics
puts limitations to knowing the configuration, it still allows in principle to measure
the configuration with arbitrary accuracy; thus, the access to the configuration is
less restricted than the one to the m function in GRWm, which, as we show in
Section 3, cannot be measured with microscopic accuracy.)
6. It is impossible to measure the velocity of a particle in Bohmian mechanics [18, 19]
(except when information about the wave function is given). That is, there is no
machine into which we could insert a particle with arbitrary wave function ψ and
which would display correctly the velocity of the particle (i.e., the velocity right
before the experiment). Note that the measurement of velocity would amount to
(what we called) a genuine measurement, not a quantum measurement.
It is possible, in contrast, to build a machine that will correctly measure the ve-
locity if the machine is told what ψ is; for example, the machine could measure
the position of the particle (to sufficient accuracy) and then compute the velocity
using Bohm’s equation of motion. It is also in principle possible to build a ma-
chine that correctly displays the velocity after the experiment without being given
information about the wave function ψ before the experiment; a formal quantum
measurement of the momentum observable achieves this. It is also possible to
build a machine that correctly displays the velocity for a limited set of ψs (such
as approximate momentum eigenstates, i.e., wide packets of plane waves).
7. It is impossible to distinguish empirically between certain different versions of
Bohmian mechanics [29, 15], all of which lead to the appropriate |ψ|2 distribu-
tion for macroscopic configurations, or between Bohmian mechanics and Nelson’s
stochastic mechanics [35, 26], or (presumably) between Bohmian mechanics and
some versions of the many-worlds theory [4].
8. It is impossible to distinguish empirically between GRWm and GRWf [3, 30].
9. The study of Colin et al. on superselection rules [12] identified cases in GRWm
in which a “weak” but no “strong” superselection rule holds, which means that
for every superposition ψ (of eigenvectors of the superselected operator) there is
a mixture µ (of eigenvectors) that cannot be empirically distinguished from ψ,
while µ leads to different histories of the primitive ontology (PO, or local beables)
than ψ. As a consequence, the difference between the PO arising from ψ and that
arising from µ cannot be detected empirically. The concrete example in GRWm
amounts more or less to the fact that the m function cannot be measured with
microscopic accuracy.
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10. Whether the Heisenberg uncertainty relation is or is not an instance of a limitation
to knowledge, depends on the precise version of quantum mechanics used.
In Bohmian mechanics, it is: Certain standard experiments realizing a “quantum
measurement of the momentum observable” (such as letting a particle move freely
for a long time t, then measuring its position Q(t) to sufficient accuracy, and
multiplying by m/t) actually measure (mass times) the long-time average of the
Bohmian velocity, u = limt→∞Q(t)/t, which is a deterministic function of the
initial position Q(0) and the initial wave function ψ0, u = u(Q(0), ψ0). The
Heisenberg uncertainty relation implies that for a Bohmian particle with position
Q and wave function ψ, even if ψ is known, the values of Q and u(Q,ψ) cannot
both be known with arbitrary accuracy, although both quantities have precise
values in reality.4
In collapse theories such as GRWm and GRWf, in contrast, there is no precise value
of either the position or the momentum observable before E , if E is an experiment
that can be regarded as a “quantum measurement of position or momentum.” In
particular, E is not a measurement in the literal sense. Rather, the outcome of
such an experiment is a random value that is only generated in the course of the
experiment. Since, as long as no such experiment is carried out, there is no fact
about the value of the position or the momentum observable, there is nothing to
be ignorant of. As a consequence, the Heisenberg uncertainty relation does not
constitute a limitation to knowledge in GRW theories.
11. Chaos leads to practical limitations: If the behavior of a (classical) dynamical
system depends sensitively on the initial conditions, and if our knowledge of the
initial conditions has limited accuracy, then we may be unable to predict the be-
havior although the system is deterministic in principle. This fact can be regarded
as a limitation to knowledge, too, but there is a fundamental difference to the lim-
itations of knowledge discussed in this paper: There is no reason in sight for why
this limitation should be unsurmountable. If we are willing to make a bigger effort
when measuring the initial conditions so as to obtain higher accuracy, and if we
are willing to make a bigger effort in the computation of predictions, then we may
be able to predict the behavior of the system for a longer time interval.
1.2 Remarks
1. There are parallels between the limitations to knowledge discussed in this pa-
per and Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem [25]. While Go¨del’s theorem concerns a
mathematical statement that is formally undecidable, our results concern physical
statements that are empirically undecidable. The distinction between true and
4It is possible, however, to measure Q (to sufficient accuracy) and then calculate u(Q,ψ) if ψ is
known. Since this measurement will change the wave function, it is afterwards still not known what
the present value of u is; we only obtain information about what u(Q,ψ) was before the measurement,
not about what it is now after the measurement.
7
provable in mathematics resembles the distinction between real and observable
in physics. Mathematical platonism, which can be described as the view that a
mathematical statement can be true even if it is not provable, is parallel to realism,
which can be described as the view that something can be a physical fact even
if it is not observable; mathematical formalism, the opposite view, is parallel to
physical positivism. A basic difference between Go¨del’s theorem and our results
is that we can know the truth value of Go¨del’s undecidable statement: it is true.
That is, while the truth value is unknowable to the formal system, it is knowable
to us. Thus, the situation of Go¨del’s undecidable statement is more analogous to
that of the physical laws (as discussed in item 7 above) than to that of measuring,
say, the number of collapses. Namely, while we often have no more information
about the number of collapses than its a priori probability distribution, we may
be able to guess the physical laws, and thus prefer one among several empirically
equivalent theories, on the basis of the simplicity, naturalness, elegance, and plau-
sibility of the theory, even though our intuition will not provide as reliable and
clear a decision as about the truth value of Go¨del’s undecidable statement. Fi-
nally, we note that there may be, besides Go¨del’s statement, other examples of
formally undecidable statements that leave us completely and permanently in the
dark as to what their truth values are.
2. There are also parallels between the limitations to knowledge discussed in this
paper and Carnot’s theory of heat engines: Not all of the energy contained in a
system can be extracted in a useful form (i.e., as work); not all of the information
contained in a system can be extracted in a useful form (i.e., as human knowledge).
By the latter statement we mean that not all of the facts true of a system can be
found out empirically.
2 Brief Review of GRW Theories
2.1 The GRW Process
In both the GRWm and the GRWf theory the evolution of the wave function follows,
instead of the Schro¨dinger equation, a stochastic jump process in Hilbert space, called
the GRW process. Consider a quantum system of (what would normally be called) N
“particles,” described by a wave function ψ = ψ(q1, . . . , qN), qi ∈ R3, i = 1, . . . , N . The
GRW process behaves as if an “observer” outside the universe made unsharp “quantum
measurements” of the position observable of a randomly selected particle at random
times T1, T2, . . . that occur with constant rate Nλ, where λ is a new constant of nature
of order of 10−16 s−1, called the collapse rate per particle. The wave function “collapses”
at every time T = Tk, i.e., it changes discontinuously and randomly as follows. The
post-collapse wave function ψT+ = limt↘T ψt is obtained from the pre-collapse wave
function ψT− = limt↗T ψt by multiplication by a Gaussian function,
ψT+(q1, . . . , qN) =
1
N
gσ(qI −X)1/2 ψT−(q1, . . . , qN) , (3)
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where
gσ(x) =
1
(2piσ2)3/2
e−
x2
2σ2 (4)
is the 3-dimensional Gaussian function of width σ, I is chosen randomly from 1, . . . , N ,
and
N = N (X) =
(∫
R3N
dq1 · · · dqN gσ(qI −X) |ψT−(q1, . . . , qN)|2
)1/2
(5)
is a normalization factor. The width σ is another new constant of nature of order of
10−7 m, while the center X = Xk is chosen randomly with probability density
ρ(x) = N (x)2 . (6)
We will refer to (Xk, Tk) as the space-time location of the collapse.
Between the collapses, the wave function evolves according to the Schro¨dinger equa-
tion corresponding to the standard Hamiltonian H governing the system, e.g., given, for
N spinless particles, by
H = −
N∑
i=1
~2
2mi
∇2qi + V, (7)
where mi, i = 1, . . . , N , are the masses of the particles, and V is the potential energy
function of the system. Due to the stochastic evolution, the wave function ψt at time t
is random.
This completes our description of the GRW law for the evolution of the wave function.
According to the GRW theories, the wave function ψ of the universe evolves according to
this stochastic law, starting from the initial time (say, the big bang). As a consequence
[5, 30], a subsystem of the universe (comprising M < N “particles”) will have a wave
function ϕ of its own that evolves according to the appropriate M -particle version of
the GRW process during the time interval [t1, t2], provided that ψ(t1) = ϕ(t1) ⊗ χ(t1)
and that the system is isolated from its environment during that interval.
We now turn to the primitive ontology (PO), that is, the part of the ontology (i.e.,
of what exists, according to the theory) that represents matter in space and time (and
of which macroscopic objects consist), according to the theory. Without such further
ontology, the GRW theory would not be satisfactory as a fundamental physical theory
[33, 34, 3, 32, 1, 2]. In the subsections below we present two versions of the GRW theory,
based on two different choices of the PO, namely the matter density ontology (GRWm
in Section 2.2) and the flash ontology (GRWf in Section 2.3).
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2.2 GRWm
GRWm postulates that, at every time t, matter is continuously distributed in space with
density function m(x, t) for every location x ∈ R3, given by
m(x, t) =
N∑
i=1
mi
∫
R3N
dq1 · · · dqN δ3(qi − x)
∣∣ψt(q1, . . . , qN)∣∣2 (8)
=
N∑
i=1
mi
∫
R3(N−1)
dq1 · · · dqi−1 dqi+1 · · · dqN
∣∣ψt(q1, . . . , qi−1, x, qi+1, . . . , qN)∣∣2 . (9)
In words, one starts with the |ψ|2–distribution in configuration space R3N , then obtains
the marginal distribution of the i-th degree of freedom qi ∈ R3 by integrating out all
other variables qj, j 6= i, multiplies by the mass associated with qi, and sums over i.
Alternatively, (8) can be rewritten as
m(x, t) = 〈ψt|M̂(x)|ψt〉 (10)
with
M̂(x) =
∑
i
mi δ
3(Q̂i − x) (11)
the mass density operator, defined in terms of the position operators Q̂iψ(q1, . . . , qN) =
qi ψ(q1, . . . , qN).
2.3 GRWf
According to GRWf, the PO is given by “events” in space-time called flashes, mathe-
matically described by points in space-time. What this means is that in GRWf matter
is neither made of particles following world lines, nor of a continuous distribution of
matter such as in GRWm, but rather of discrete points in space-time, in fact finitely
many points in every bounded space-time region.
In the GRWf theory, the space-time locations of the flashes can be read off from the
history of the wave function: every flash corresponds to one of the spontaneous collapses
of the wave function, and its space-time location is just the space-time location of that
collapse. The flashes form the set
F = {(X1, T1), . . . , (Xk, Tk), . . .} (12)
(with T1 < T2 < . . .). Alternatively, we may postulate that flashes can be of N different
types (“colors”), corresponding to the mathematical description
F = {(X1, T1, I1), . . . , (Xk, Tk, Ik), . . .} , (13)
with Ik the number of the particle affected by the k-th collapse.
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Note that if the number N of degrees of freedom in the wave function is large, as in
the case of a macroscopic object, the number of flashes is also large (if λ = 10−15 s−1 and
N = 1023, we obtain 108 flashes per second). Therefore, for a reasonable choice of the
parameters of the GRWf theory, a cubic centimeter of solid matter contains more than
108 flashes per second. That is to say that large numbers of flashes can form macroscopic
shapes, such as tables and chairs. That is how we find an image of our world in GRWf.
We should remark that the word “particle” can be misleading. According to GRWf,
there are no particles in the world, just flashes and a wave function. According to
GRWm, there are no particles, just continuously distributed matter and a wave function.
The word “particle” should thus not be taken literally (just like, e.g., the word “sunrise”);
we use it only because it is common terminology in quantum mechanics.
3 First Examples of Limitations to Knowledge in
GRW Theories
An important tool for the analysis of limitations to knowledge is the main theorem about
POVMs, which says that for every experiment E on a system “sys” there is a POVM
(positive-operator-valued measure5) E on the value space of E acting on the system’s
Hilbert space Hsys such that if sys has wave function ψ and E is carried out then the
outcome Z has probability distribution
P(Z = z) = 〈ψ|Ez|ψ〉 . (14)
This theorem has been proven for Bohmian mechanics [18], GRWf [39, 30], and GRWm
[30]; a similar result for GRWm can be found in [6]. In orthodox quantum mechanics,
the theorem is true as well, taking for granted that, after E , a quantum measurement
of the position observable of the pointer of E ’s apparatus will yield the result of E .
From the main theorem about POVMs we can deduce a first limitation to knowledge
[30]: that it is impossible to measure the matter density m(x, t) in GRWm. More
precisely, it is impossible to build a machine that will, when fed with a system with any
wave function ψ, determine m(x). This is because the outcome Z of any experiment in
a GRW world has a probability distribution P(Z = z) whose dependence on the wave
function is quadratic, 〈ψ|E(z)|ψ〉, while the m(x) function (or, in fact, any functional of
the wave function) is deterministic in ψ, that is, its probability distribution is a Dirac
delta function and not quadratic.6 This result notwithstanding, it is possible to measure
5A POVM is a family of positive operators Ez such that
∑
z Ez = I, the identity operator. It
is also known as a generalized observable and in fact generalizes the notion of a quantum observable
represented by a self-adjoint operator A, which applies to an ideal quantum measurement. For an ideal
quantum measurement, the values z are the eigenvalues of A and Ez is the projection to the eigenspace.
6The fact that the deterministic value of m(x) is given by a quadratic expression in ψ, viz. (8),
should not be confused with the condition that the probability distribution of m(x) depend on ψ in a
quadratic way.
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m(x) with limited accuracy, that is, to measure a macroscopic, coarse-grained version
of m(x); this we will study in Section 5.
The same type of argument shows [30] that it is impossible to measure the wave
function ψt of a system in either GRWm or GRWf (or in Bohmian mechanics, many-
worlds, or orthodox quantum mechanics, for that matter).
Let us compare the situation in GRW theories to that of Bohmian mechanics. As
mentioned above, the velocity of a given Bohmian particle is not measurable. On the
other hand, there is no limitation in principle in Bohmian mechanics to measuring
the position of a particle to arbitrary accuracy, except that doing so will alter the
particle’s (conditional) wave function, and thus its future trajectory. Here we encounter
a basic difference between Bohmian mechanics and GRWm: the configuration of the
primitive ontology can be measured in Bohmian mechanics but not in GRWm. (In
Bohmian mechanics, the configuration of the primitive ontology corresponds to the
positions of all particles, while in GRWm it corresponds to the m(x, t) function for all
x ∈ R3.) In GRWf, for comparison, there is nothing like a configuration of the primitive
ontology at time t, of which we could ask whether it can be measured. There is only a
space-time history of the primitive ontology, which we may wish to measure. Bohmian
mechanics is an example of a world in which the history of a system cannot be measured
without disturbing its course, and indeed disturbing it all the more drastically the more
accurately we try to measure it. This suggests already that also in GRWf, measuring
the pattern of flashes will entail disturbing it—and thus finding a pattern of flashes
that is different from what would have occurred naturally (i.e., without intervention),
so that this experiment could not be regarded as a genuine measurement of the pattern
of flashes.
4 Measurements of Flashes in GRWf, or of Col-
lapses in GRWm
Even if we accept disturbances, the following heuristic reasoning suggests that individual
flashes cannot be detected. Suppose we had an apparatus capable of detecting flashes
in a system. Think of the wave function of system and apparatus together as a func-
tion on configuration space R3N , and think of configurations as one would in Bohmian
mechanics. Let R0 be the set of those configurations q such that in a Bohmian world in
configuration q the apparatus display reads “no flash detected so far,” and let R1 be the
set of those configurations in which the display reads “one flash detected so far.” Then
R1 is disjoint from R0. Recall that a flash in the system leads to a change in the wave
function of the form
ψ → ψ′ = 1
N
gσ(qi − x)1/2 ψ . (15)
But such a change does not push the wave function from R0 to R1. That is, if ψ, as a
function on R3N , is concentrated in the region R0, then ψ′ as given by (15) will not be
concentrated in R1; instead, it is still concentrated in (some subset of) R0.
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While the macroscopic equivalence class7 of the pattern of flashes is measurable, we
are led to suspecting that the microscopic details of the pattern are not. In what sense
exactly that is or is not the case will be discussed in this section.
Note first that the main theorem about POVMs does not directly exclude measure-
ments of F , the pattern of flashes, in the way it directly excluded measurements of m(x)
or ψ. After all, the argument was that the probability distribution of m(x) or ψ does not
depend quadratically on ψ. The probability distribution of F , in contrast, does depend
on ψ in a quadratic way: There is a continuous POVM G(f) on the space of all flash
histories f such that the probability density of F is given by
P(F = f) = 〈ψ|G(f)|ψ〉 , (16)
with ψ the initial wave function [39, 30]. Of course, this fact does not imply that F can
be measured—and we are claiming that it cannot.
To approach the question whether one can detect an individual flash (or an individual
collapse in GRWm), we begin with a simple example.
4.1 An Example in which ψ is Known
Suppose ψ is the wave function of a single particle and a superposition of two wave
packets with disjoint supports in space,
ψ = 1√
2
|here〉+ 1√
2
|there〉 , (17)
as may result from a double-slit setup. (The reasoning that is to follow will also apply
to a molecule or small solid body with |here〉 and |there〉 differing by a shift in the
center-of-mass coordinate that makes their supports disjoint.) Suppose, for simplicity,
that the Hamiltonian of the system vanishes, so that the Schro¨dinger time evolution
is trivial. We ask whether any flash at all occurs during the time interval [t1, t2]. We
are interested in the case in which the probability of a flash is neither close to 1 nor
close to 0, a case that can be arranged by suitable choice of the duration t2− t1. (For a
single particle, this choice might mean the duration is millions of years; we might either
consider this case as a theoretical exercise, or consider instead the center-of-mass of a
many-particle system to reduce the duration. To obtain a reasonable duration, we may
want to consider the case that the number of particles is big (say, > 1010) but not too
big (say, < 1020); anyway, that makes no difference to the theoretical analysis.)
For simplicity, we ignore the possibility of multiple collapses and assume that a
collapse occurs with probability p, and no collapse with probability 1−p. Let us further
assume that the two packets |here〉 and |there〉 have width less than σ but separation
greater than σ, so that after collapse the wave function is either approximately |here〉
or approximately |there〉. For simplicity, let us assume that after collapse the wave
7Consider two patterns of flashes in space-time. We call them macroscopically equivalent if they look
alike on the macroscopic level. While the notion of macroscopic equivalence is not precisely defined, it
is roughly defined.
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function is either exactly |here〉 or exactly |there〉, each with probability 1/2. Thus the
final wave function ψ′ is distributed according to
P(ψ′ = ψ) = 1− p ,
P(ψ′ = |here〉) = p/2 (18)
P(ψ′ = |there〉) = p/2 .
Let C ∈ {0, 1} be the random number of collapses.
We ask whether and how well an experiment beginning at time t2 can decide whether
a collapse has occurred. This amounts essentially to distinguishing between the three
vectors |here〉, |there〉, and ψ. While |here〉 and |there〉 are orthogonal, ψ is not or-
thogonal to either. As is well known, it is not possible to distinguish reliably between
non-orthogonal vectors. (Our question can also be regarded as a special case of the
question how well an experiment can distinguish between two density matrices ρ1, ρ2;
see Section 4.5.)
The following experiment E1 provides probabilistic information about C: carry out
a “quantum measurement of the observable” E1 given by the projection to the 1-
dimensional subspace orthogonal to that spanned by (17),
E1 = I − |ψ〉〈ψ| (19)
with I the identity operator. If the result Z was 1, then it can be concluded that
a collapse has occurred, C = 1. (Because if no collapse has occurred, then ψ′ = ψ
and Z = 0 with probability 1.) If the result Z was 0, nothing can be concluded with
certainty (since also |here〉 and |there〉 lead to a probability of 1/2 for the outcome to
be 0). However, in this case the (Bayesian) conditional probability that a collapse has
occurred is less than p (and thus Z is informative about C):
P(C = 1|Z = 0) = P(C = 1, Z = 0)
P(C = 1, Z = 0) + P(C = 0, Z = 0)
(20)
=
P(Z = 0|C = 1)P(C = 1)
P(Z = 0|C = 1)P(C = 1) + P(Z = 0|C = 0)P(C = 0) (21)
=
1
2
p
1
2
p+ 1 · (1− p) =
p
2− p < p . (22)
Thus, in every case the experiment can retrodict C with greater precision than it could
have been predicted a priori (i.e., than attributing probability p to a collapse and 1− p
to no collapse).
To quantify the usefulness of the experiment, we define the reliability R(E ) of a
yes-no experiment (or 1-0 experiment) E as the probability that it correctly retrodicts
whether a collapse has occurred,
R(E ) = P(Z = 0, C = 0) + P(Z = 1, C = 1) (23)
= P(Z = 0|C = 0)P(C = 0) + P(Z = 1|C = 1)P(C = 1) . (24)
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For the particular experiment E1 just described, we find that P(Z = 0|C = 0) = 1,
P(C = 0) = 1− p, P(Z = 1|C = 1) = 1
2
, and P(C = 1) = p, so
R(E1) = 1− p
2
. (25)
(See Proposition 9 in Appendix A for a more general result.) The fact that this quantity
is less than 1 means that this experiment cannot decide with certainty whether a collapse
has occured.
Proposition 1. [13] For the initial wave function (17) and 0 ≤ p ≤ 2/3, no experiment
at time t2 can retrodict C with greater reliability than the quantum measurement of
E1 = I − |ψ〉〈ψ|:
∀E ∀p ∈ [0, 2
3
] : R(E ) ≤ 1− p
2
. (26)
In particular, for p 6= 0 it is impossible to determine with reliability 1 whether a collapse
has occurred or not.
The proof [13] of this proposition relies, of course, on the main theorem about
POVMs, which associates with every yes-no experiment (acting on a system with wave
functions that are superpositions of |here〉 and |there〉) a positive semi-definite 2 × 2
matrix E (namely, E = Eyes, while Eno = I − Eyes). The proof shows that there is no
such matrix E for which R exceeds 1 − p/2. We note that R(E ) depends on E only
through E, that is, two experiments with the same POVM have the same reliability (see
Proposition 9 in Appendix A).
Proposition 1 expresses a limitation to knowledge: Although we can empirically
gain some information about the value of C, we cannot obtain full information, i.e.,
we cannot measure C with certainty. In fact, not even close to certainty: While the
maximal reliability 1 − p/2 is close to 1 if p is small, in this case it is easy to guess
correctly without any experiment whether a collapse occurred: no. In other words, the
reliability 1− p/2 can be put into perspective by comparing it to that of blind guessing,
i.e., of the experiment E∅ that does not even interact with the system but always answers
“no” if p ≤ 1/2 and always “yes” if p > 1/2. (We think of p as known.) This experiment
(which corresponds to E = 0 if p ≤ 1/2 and to E = I if p > 1/2) has reliability
R(E∅) = max{p, 1− p} . (27)
For 0 ≤ p ≤ 1/2, the optimal reliability is right in the middle between the trivial
achievement R = 1−p and the desired achievement R = 1; for 1/2 ≤ p ≤ 2/3, it is even
closer to the trivial achievement R = p. For p > 2/3, the situation is even worse:
Proposition 2. [13] For ψ as in (17) and 2/3 ≤ p ≤ 1, no experiment at time t2 can
retrodict C with greater reliability than blind guessing:
∀E ∀p ∈ [2
3
, 1] : R(E ) ≤ p . (28)
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Figure 1: Reliability of experiments for detecting a collapse of the wave function (17)
to one of the two contributions, as a function of p, the probability of collapse. Graphs
are shown for blind guessing, for the quantum measurement of E1 = I − |ψ〉〈ψ|, and for
the maximal value of any experiment.
See Figure 1.
One can understand easily why the optimal strategy changes at p = 2/3. Suppose
we carry out E1 (corresponding to I − |ψ〉〈ψ|) and obtain outcome Z; as we saw above,
if Z = 1 then a collapse must have occurred, and if Z = 0 then the probability that a
collapse occurred is p/(2 − p); this value is < 1/2 for p < 2/3 and > 1/2 for p > 2/3.
Thus, for p < 2/3 the best retrodiction in case Z = 0 is that no collapse occurred,
whereas for p > 2/3 it is better to always answer “yes” in both cases, Z = 1 and Z = 0.
4.2 Other Choices of ψ
The fact that knowledge is limited does not depend on whether the superposition (17)
involved two or more contributions, nor on whether the coefficients of the contributions
were equal. Consider an arbitrary initial wave function ψ from the unit sphere S(H )
of an n-dimensional Hilbert space H and an orthonormal basis B = {b1, . . . , bn} of
H . Suppose that collapse occurs with probability p and projects ψ to one of the basis
vectors with the quantum probability; that is, the final state vector ψ′ has distribution
P
(
ψ′ = 〈bk|ψ〉|〈bk|ψ〉|bk
)
= |〈bk|ψ〉|2 p , (29)
P(ψ′ = ψ) = 1− p . (30)
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Then the reliability, which depends on ψ and on the experiment E , is bounded by [13]
Rψ(E ) ≤ 1− p
n
∀ψ ∈ S(H ) ∀E ∀p ∈ [0, n
n+1
] . (31)
Equality holds for ψ =
∑
k n
−1/2bk and E the quantum measurement of E = I−|ψ〉〈ψ|.
For other ψ, the optimal reliability Rψ = maxE Rψ(E ) is even less than 1 − p/n; for
ψ = 2−1/2b1 + 2−1/2b2 it is still Rψ = 1 − p/2. Curiously, for generic ψ the optimal
experiment is different from the quantum measurement of I − |ψ〉〈ψ|; it is still of the
form I − |ψ˜〉〈ψ˜| but with ψ˜ 6= ψ; we will give more detail around (46) below.
For p > n/(n + 1), no experiment is more reliable than blind guessing (for which
(27) is still valid),
Rψ(E ) ≤ p ∀ψ ∈ S(H ) ∀E ∀p ∈ [ nn+1 , 1] . (32)
4.3 Experiments Beginning Before t2
So far we have considered only experiments beginning at t2. One might think that an
apparatus might do better that interacts with the system during [t1, t2], for example
because it might seem easier to detect a flash when it happens than at a later time.
However, as mentioned already at the end of Section 3, when trying to measure the
flashes in a system during [t1, t2] we do not want to disturb them; that is, we want them to
occur in the same pattern as they would have occurred without intervention. Of course,
in a stochastic theory it is not meaningful to ask after an intervention during [t1, t2]
whether the pattern of flashes in [t1, t2] would have been the same had no intervention
occurred. It is meaningful, however, to ask whether the distribution of the flashes would
have been the same had no intervention occurred. We now show that the distribution
will in fact be changed by any informative intervention and conclude that an experiment
interacting with the system before t2 will necessarily disturb the flashes during [t1, t2].
The key to showing that the probability distribution of the flashes after the inter-
vention is different from what it would have been without intervention is that the wave
function of the system gets changed by the intervention. Indeed, imagine an experiment
End (nd stands for “non-disturbing”) that, when applied to a system with a wave func-
tion ψ′ as in (18), will return the system undisturbed, with the same wave function ψ′.
Then End will not reveal whether a collapse has occurred or not (i.e., whether ψ′ = ψ
or not), and in fact will yield no information at all about this question; that is, if Z is
the outcome of End and C the number of collapses (i.e., C = 0 if ψ′ = ψ and C = 1
otherwise), then the conditional distribution of Z given C does not depend on C,
P(Z = z|C = 0) = P(Z = z|C = 1) (33)
for all z.8
8A slightly stronger statement is true: Suppose that End, when applied to a system with a wave
function ψ′ that is either |here〉 or |there〉 or ψ as in (17), will return the system undisturbed. Then
End will not reveal which state ψ′ is, and in fact will yield no information at all about ψ′; that is, the
conditional distribution of Z, given ψ′, does not depend on what ψ′ is, P
(
Z = z
∣∣ψ′ = |here〉) = P(Z =
z
∣∣ψ′ = |there〉) = P(Z = z∣∣ψ′ = ψ). This follows from standard quantum measurement theory.
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Indeed, consider applying End at time t2 repeatedly, N times, to a system with wave
function ψ′ as in (18) without giving it the possibility to collapse in between. For
c ∈ {0, 1}, let Pz,c = P(Z = z|C = c) with Z the outcome of a single run of End on
a system in state ψ′ as in (18). Since the outcomes of the repeated runs of End are
stochastically independent, the number of z-occurrences will, conditionally on C = c,
have a binomial distribution with parameters N and Pz,c, so that Pz,C can be read off
from the number of z-occurrences with reliability arbitrarily close to 1, provided that
N is sufficiently large. If, for any z, Pz,1 6= Pz,0 then the value of C could be read off
from that of Pz,C , so C could be determined as reliably as desired, which contradicts
the bound of Proposition 1. Thus, Pz,1 = Pz,0.
4.4 If ψ is Random
In the previous subsections, we assumed that the initial (i.e., pre-collapse) wave function
ψ is known. Now assume that ψ is not known, but random with known probability
distribution µ over the unit sphere S(H ). So we have limited information about ψ.
Then the reliability of a yes-no experiment E , i.e., the probability that the experiment
correctly answers whether a collapse has occurred, is easily found to be
Rµ(E ) = EµRψ(E ) =
∫
S(H )
µ(dψ)Rψ(E ) . (34)
From (31) and (32), we immediately have that for all µ and all E ,
Rµ(E ) ≤
{
1− p
n
if 0 ≤ p ≤ n
n+1
p if n
n+1
≤ p ≤ 1 . (35)
We also note that Rµ(E ) depends on µ only through ρµ; that is, two distributions with
the same density matrix lead to the same reliability for each experiment, Rµ(E ) = Rρ(E )
for ρ = ρµ (see Proposition 9 in Appendix A).
9
An extreme case is the uniform distribution u over S(H ), or any distribution µ with
density matrix ρµ = ρu =
1
n
I. For this case we obtain a stronger limitation:
Proposition 3. Let u be the uniform distribution on S(H ). Then
Ru(E ) ≤ max{p, 1− p} (36)
for every experiment E at time t2. That is, no experiment is more reliable than blind
guessing. If p = 1
2
then, in fact, Ru(E ) = 1/2 for every experiment E at time t2.
We give the proof in Appendix A.
9In fact, the same value Rρ(E ) of reliability applies also when the density matrix ρ arises not from a
mixture with distribution µ but as the reduced density matrix when the system S under consideration
is entangled with another system T , i.e., ρ = trT |ψ〉〈ψ| with ψ the pure state of S and T together [13].
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Proposition 3 expresses a severe limitation to knowledge: If ψ is uniformly distributed
then the reliability of any experiment is no greater than that of blind guessing. Here is
an even stronger statement: If ψ is uniformly distributed then no experiment can convey
any information at all about whether or not a collapse has occurred. More precisely,
no experiment on the system can produce an outcome Z such that the conditional
distribution P(C|Z) would be any different from the a priori distribution (p, 1− p):
Proposition 4. Consider the collapse process as in (29)–(30) and an arbitrary experi-
ment E at time t2, possibly with more than two possible outcomes. Let ψ be uniformly
distributed on S(H ). Then P(C = 1|Z) = p and P(C = 0|Z) = 1− p.
4.5 Optimal Way of Distinguishing Two Density Matrices
The problem of distinguishing, at time t2, whether the wave function is collapsed or
not, can be regarded as a special case of the problem of distinguishing two probability
distributions µ1, µ2 on S(H ), or of distinguishing two density matrices ρ1, ρ2. That
is, suppose that a number X ∈ {1, 2} gets chosen randomly with P(X = 1) = p and
P(X = 2) = 1−p; as a second step, we are given a system with a random wave function
ψ′ chosen according to µX . We can also suppose more directly that, as the second step
in the experiment, we are given a system with density matrix ρX ; this density matrix
may arise from some distribution µX , or from tracing out some other system, or both.
Our previous scenario of (29)–(30) corresponds to the special case
µ1 =
∑
k
|〈bk|ψ〉|2δckbk , ρ1 = diag |ψ〉〈ψ| , (37)
µ2 = δψ , ρ2 = |ψ〉〈ψ| (38)
with ck = 〈bk|ψ〉/|〈bk|ψ〉| and
diagA =
∑
k
|bk〉〈bk|A|bk〉〈bk| . (39)
We now ask, how well can we retrodict X from experiments on the system? Again,
any experiment E with two possible outcomes, 1 and 2, is characterized by a self-adjoint
operator 0 ≤ E ≤ I (i.e., one with eigenvalues between 0 and 1), namely E = E1 (so that
E2 = I −E), and the usefulness of E for our purpose can be quantified by its reliability
R(ρ1, ρ2,E ), i.e., the probability that its outcome Z agrees with X. Using that the main
theorem about POVMs applies also to systems that have a density matrix, rather than
a wave function, and then says that the outcome Z has probability distribution
P(Z = z) = tr(ρE) , (40)
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we find that
R(ρ1, ρ2,E ) = P(Z = 1, X = 1) + P(Z = 2, X = 2) (41)
= P(Z = 1|X = 1)P(X = 1) + P(Z = 2|X = 2)P(X = 2) (42)
= p tr
(
Eρ1
)
+ (1− p) tr((I − E)ρ2) (43)
= 1− p+ tr
(
E
(
pρ1 − (1− p)ρ2
))
. (44)
Note that the reliability depends on E only through E.
Which E will maximize the reliability for given ρ1, ρ2, and p?
Proposition 5 (Helstrom [31]). For a given self-adjoint operator A, tr(EA) is maxi-
mized among Es with 0 ≤ E ≤ I by those and only those E with
P+(A) ≤ E ≤ P+(A) + P0(A) , (45)
where P+(A) is the projection to the subspace H+(A) spanned by all eigenvectors of A
with positive eigenvalues, and P0(A) is the projection to the eigenspace H0(A) of A with
eigenvalue 0. If 0 is not an eigenvalue of A, then P0(A) = 0, and the optimizer E =
P+(A) is unique. The maximal value of tr(EA) is the sum of the positive eigenvalues of
A (with multiplicities).
In our case, the projection to H+(pρ1− (1−p)ρ2) is an optimal choice of E, and the
maximal reliability is 1 − p plus the sum of all positive eigenvalues of pρ1 − (1 − p)ρ2;
this reliability is < 1 unless H+(ρ1) is orthogonal to H+(ρ2).
Coming back to the special case (37)–(38) with known ψ, this optimal E operator
and the maximal reliability can be specified explicitly. For the sake of completeness, we
quote the formulas from [13]:
Eoptψ,p =
{
I − |ψ˜〉〈ψ˜| if 0 < p ≤ n
n+1
,
I if n
n+1
≤ p < 1 , (46)
with ψ˜ = M−1ψ/‖M−1ψ‖, M = zψ,pI + diag |ψ〉〈ψ|,
zψ,p = f
−1
ψ
( p
1− p
)
≥ 0 , fψ(z) =
n∑
k=1
|ψk|2
z + |ψk|2 for z ≥ 0 , (47)
and
Roptψ,p =
{
p(1 + zψ,p) if 0 < p ≤ nn+1 ,
p if n
n+1
≤ p < 1 . (48)
4.6 If ψ is Unknown
Often it is desirable to have an experiment that works for unknown ψ. However, it is not
obvious what it should mean for an experiment to work for unknown ψ. One approach,
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with a Bayesian flavor, would be to take this to mean that the experiment works (i.e.,
is more reliable than blind guessing) for random ψ with uniform distribution. We have
already discussed this scenario and can conclude that in this approach it is impossible
for the inhabitants of a GRWm or GRWf world to measure the collapses.
However, it can be questioned whether an unknown ψ can be assumed to be uniformly
distributed. So here is another approach. Obviously, any experiment E that we choose
will have high reliability for some ψs and low reliability (lower than blind guessing) for
other ψs (as the average reliability over all ψ equals that of blind guessing). We may
wish to maximize the size of the set
SE =
{
ψ ∈ S(H ) : Rψ(E ) > max{p, 1− p}
}
, (49)
the set of ψs for which E is more reliable than blind guessing. The natural measure of
“size” is the (normalized) uniform distribution u on S(H ). There do exist experiments
for which u(SE ) > 1/2 [14], but we have reason [14] to conjecture that u(SE ) ≤ 1−1/e ≈
0.632. If this is right, it is another curious limitation to knowledge: While you can do
better than blind guessing on more than 50% of all wave functions, you cannot do better
than blind guessing on more than 64% of all wave functions.
Here are further results concerning u(SE ), expressing limitations to knowledge.
Proposition 6. [14] For p < 1/2− 1/√8 ≈ 0.146 and p > 1/2 + 1/√8 ≈ 0.854, all H
and all E , u(SE ) ≤ 1/2.
That is, for p close to 0 or 1, one cannot even do better than blind guessing for a
majority of wave functions.
Proposition 7. [14] For H with dimH = 2, all 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 and all E , u(SE ) ≤ 1/2.
5 Measurements of m(x) in GRWm
In this section we investigate the accuracy and reliability of genuine measurements of
m(x) by inhabitants of a GRWm universe. We have shown above that m(x) is not
measurable with microscopic accuracy. We now show that it is measurable on the
macroscopic level. Our analysis can be regarded as an elaboration of statements by
Ghirardi et al. [23], [5, section 10.2] to the effect that different degrees of “accessibility”
of m(x) can occur. Specifically, we confirm that the quantity R(V ) that they intro-
duced governs the measurability of m(x): the average of m(x) over V can be measured
accurately and reliably whenever R(V ) is small.
So consider a coarse-grained, macroscopic version m˜(x) of m(x), for example
m˜1(x) = (g` ∗m)(x) =
N∑
i=1
mi 〈ψ|g`(Q̂i − x)|ψ〉 (50)
with ∗ convolution, g` the Gaussian function of width ` as in (4), and ` the length scale
of the coarse graining (independent of the GRW length σ), or, based on a partition of
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R3 into cubes of side length `,
m˜2(x) =
1
`3
∫
C(x)
dx′m(x′) , (51)
with C(x) the cube containing x.
Here is a simple procedure for a measurement of m˜(x) (or of m(x) with inaccuracy
`). While this procedure is not practically feasible, it shows the possibility in principle
and may suggest more practical schemes if those are desired. We consider a macroscopic
system of N “particles” with (GRW) wave function ψ(q) = ψ(q1, . . . , qN). Carry out
an ideal quantum measurement of the position observables on all N particles, with
outcome Q = (Q1, . . . , QN) distributed with distribution density P(Q = q) = |ψ(q)|2;
let the estimator for m˜(x) be
M(x) =
N∑
i=1
mi δ
3(Qi − x) (52)
or a coarse-grained version M˜(x) of M(x), for example
M˜1(x) =
N∑
i=1
mi g`(Qi − x) (53)
or
M˜2(x) =
1
`3
∫
C(x)
dx′M(x′) =
1
`3
∑
i:Qi∈C(x)
mi . (54)
Put differently, M(x) are the outcomes of a joint ideal quantum measurement of the
commuting observables M̂(x), the mass density operators as in (11).
It follows from (10) that
m(x) = EM(x) and m˜1,2(x) = EM˜1,2(x) . (55)
So the estimator will be close to the true value if its variance is small. Specifically,
the relative inaccuracy with which m˜2(x) can be measured in this way is the standard
deviation of M˜2(x) divided by m˜2(x), which is exactly Ghirardi’s R(V ) with V = C(x),
R(C(x)) =
〈ψ|( 1
`3
M̂(C(x))− m˜2(x))2|ψ〉1/2
m˜2(x)
. (56)
While we do not have a proof that no other method of estimating m˜2(x) is more accurate,
this seems plausible, as no better method comes to mind.
Obviously, the inaccuracy (56) depends on the wave function ψ. This leads us to
the question, for typical wave functions arising from the GRW process, how large do
we have to choose ` to make the inaccuracy R(C(x)) smaller than, say, 10%? Let us
consider a few examples.
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An object of macroscopic size consisting of a uniform solid or liquid at everyday
conditions has interatomic distances of 10−10 to 10−9 m, and we may expect the wave
function of the nucleus to be spread out over similar distances (except for permutation
symmetry). Since, for ` = 3 × 10−9 m, a volume of `3 contains 30 to 3 × 104 atoms,
M˜2(x) involves an average over many atoms; thus, for this size of ` or larger, we may
expect the variation of the wave function (such as the ground state of the solid) to have
little effect on M˜2(x), and R(C(x)) to be small.
Now consider a solid object O of size δ (or even a sheet of thickness δ, since only 1
dimension of space is relevant), an ` > δ, and a ψ that is a superposition of two different
positions of O with a difference greater than `. Then one term in the superposition may
correspond to O lying entirely in C(x), while the other term corresponds to O lying
entirely outside of C(x). Let the coefficients of the terms be c1 and c0, respectively; then,
for a suitable constant m0, M˜2(x), if measured, equals m0 with probability p = |c1|2 and
equals 0 with probability q = |c2|2 = 1 − |c1|2. It follows that m˜2(x) = pm0, that the
standard deviation of M˜2(x) is m0
√
pq, and that R(C(x)) =
√
q/p, which is greater
than 10% for every p < 99%. Thus, except for extreme values of p, such a superposition
yields quite a large value of R(C(x)), and thus probably low accuracy as a genuine
measurement of m˜2(x). However, since superpositions of different locations more than
σ apart are suppressed by the spontaneous collapses, such wave functions are unlikely
to occur for `  σ = 10−7 m. Or rather, they cannot persist much longer than for
∆t = 1/Nλ.
These considerations suggest that m(x) can usually be measured with small relative
inaccuracy and high reliability at a spatial and temporal resolution of
∆x = 10−7 m , ∆t =
1
N∆xλ
, (57)
where N∆x is the number of nucleons in the volume (∆x)
3. On the other hand, examples
can be set up, at least artificial ones, for which these estimates are not valid: if ψ = ϕ⊗N
with ϕ a 1-particle wave function that is spread out over distances much greater than σ,
and if the N particles do not interact (say, H = 0), then the spontaneous collapses are
not efficient at localizing the wave function, and R(C(x)) will not become small until
after 108 years (when almost every particle has been hit by a collapse).
A Proofs
Proposition 8. If µ1 6= µ2 are distributions of wave functions with equal density matri-
ces ρµ1 = ρµ2 then no experiment can distinguish between an ensemble of wave functions
with distribution µ1 and one with µ2.
Proof. This is a consequence of the main theorem about POVMs (14). If E is carried
out on an ensemble of systems with wave functions ψ ∈ S(Hsys) distributed according
to µ1 then the probability of obtaining outcome z is
P(Z = z) = tr
(
E(z)ρµ1
)
, (58)
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so it depends on µ1 only through ρµ1 . Thus, since ρµ2 = ρµ1 , the distribution of outcomes
would be the same in an ensemble distributed according to µ2.
Proposition 9. Consider the collapse process as in (29)–(30) and arbitrary E . Let Ez
be the POVM associated with E by the main theorem about POVMs, and E = Eyes.
Then
Rψ(E ) = 〈ψ|A|ψ〉 (59)
with
A = p diagE + (1− p)(I − E) (60)
and diag the “diagonal part” as defined in (39). For ψ as in (17), Rψ(E1) = 1 − p/2
(i.e., Eq. (25) holds). For random ψ with distribution µ,
Rµ(E ) = tr(ρµA) . (61)
Proof. We have that
P(Z = yes|C = 0) = 〈ψ|E|ψ〉 (62)
P(Z = yes|C = 1) =
∑
k
∣∣〈bk|ψ〉∣∣2 〈bk|E|bk〉 (63)
= 〈ψ| diagE|ψ〉 . (64)
Now (59) follows, together with (25) and (61); (25) is obtained as the special case with
ψ = 2−1/2(b1 + b2) and E = I − |ψ〉〈ψ|.
Proposition 3. Let u be the uniform distribution on S(H ). Then Ru(E ) ≤ max{p, 1−
p} for every experiment E at time t2. If p = 12 then, in fact, Ru(E ) = 1/2 for every
experiment E at time t2.
Proof. By (61),
Ru(E ) =
1
n
trA =
p
n
trE +
1− p
n
tr(I − E) = 1− p− 1− 2p
n
trE . (65)
Note that 0 ≤ E ≤ I and thus 0 ≤ trE ≤ n. For 0 ≤ p ≤ 1/2, (65) is ≤ 1 − p since
trE ≥ 0 and 1− 2p ≥ 0. For 1/2 < p ≤ 1, rewrite (65) as
Ru(E ) = p− 2p− 1
n
tr(I − E) , (66)
note tr(I − E) ≥ 0 and 2p− 1 ≥ 0, and conclude Ru(E ) ≤ p.
Proposition 4. Consider the collapse process as in (29)–(30) and an arbitrary experi-
ment E at time t2, possibly with more than two possible outcomes. Let ψ be uniformly
distributed on S(H ). Then P(C = 1|Z) = p and P(C = 0|Z) = 1− p.
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Proof. Let Ez be the POVM of E ; then
P(C = 1|Z = z) = P(Z = z|C = 1)P(C = 1)
P(Z = z|C = 0)P(C = 0) + P(Z = z|C = 1)P(C = 1) (67)
=
tr(ρ diagEz)p
tr(ρEz)(1− p) + tr(ρ diagEz)p = p (68)
using ρ = 1
n
I.
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